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ABSTRACT
Merger control authorities may approve a merger based on a so-called "efficiency defence". An
important aspect in clearing mergers is that the efficiencies need to be merger-specific. Joint
ventures, and in particular research joint ventures (RJVs), may achieve comparable efficiencies
possibly without the anti-competitive (market power) effects of mergers. We present evidence for
the semiconductor industry that RJVs indeed represent viable alternatives to mergers. We
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Many economists argue that competition authorities should take eﬃciency gains into ac-
count when examining merger cases. For example, Williamson (1968) highlighted the
trade oﬀ between market power and eﬃciency eﬀects. The US Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ revisions (1992 and 1997)
clarify the approval of mergers based on the “eﬃciency defence”. If ﬁrms can convince
merger control authorities that the eﬃciencies generated by the merger more than out-
weigh the market power eﬀects (and the former are passed-on to consumers), the merger
may be cleared.1 Under these circumstances, price may decrease and consumer welfare
may increase, see also Farrell and Shapiro (1990). A further aspect in clearing mergers
is that the eﬃciencies need to be merger-speciﬁc.T h a t i s , t h e e ﬃciencies are “unlikely
to be accomplished in the absence of either t h ep r o p o s e dm e r g e ro ra n o t h e rm e a n sh a v -
ing comparable anticompetitive eﬀects.” The Guidelines explicitly mention joint ventures
that may achieve comparable eﬃciencies possibly without the anti-competitive eﬀects of
mergers. However, very little is known about the extent to which the diﬀerent types of
cooperations achieve eﬃciency and/or market power, and there are no studies comparing
the diﬀerent modes of cooperation and assess their substitutability. This study provides
insights to what extent mergers generate (net) eﬃciency eﬀects, and whether these could
possibly be achieved by viable alternatives, such as research joint ventures (RJVs).
Mergers and RJVs can achieve a number of remedies to the shortcomings of the inno-
vation process.2 Most notably, participating ﬁrms can internalize the positive externalities
of R&D through coordinating their R&D investments. Other motives are e.g. avoiding
wasteful duplication through information sharing, exploiting scale and scope eﬀects in
1Similar regulations are currently discussed by the European Commission (see Draft Commission No-
tice on the appraisal of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, 11 December, 2002).
2A priori, one would expect that most eﬃciency eﬀects can be attributed to RJVs. Indeed, antitrust
treatment is more strict in the case of production joint ventures than in the case of RJVs, see the
discussion in Jorde and Teece (1990) and Shapiro and Willig (1990).
1R&D, sharing risks associated with uncertain technologies as well as sharing large sunk
set-up costs.3 This may increase R&D investment and hence improve eﬃciency, which
causes market shares to increase and prices to decrease (eﬃciency eﬀect). Not surpris-
ingly then, the theoretical as well as the empirical literature on RJVs conclude that RJVs
can be seen as an instrument to achieve eﬃciency gains and are beneﬁcial to consumer
welfare.4 Moreover, RJVs - in contrast to full mergers - do not reduce the number of
ﬁrms in the industry. Thus, the danger for market power increases appears to be much
less for RJVs than for mergers. Competition authorities are well aware of this fact and
view RJVs with benevolence. For example, the US Department of Justice enacted the
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 in order to enforce RJVs. This act protects
registered RJVs under the antitrust laws, such that they cannot be considered per se
illegal, and must be judged by the antitrust rule of reason. Moreover, the act reduces the
damage penalty in case of a violation of the antitrust laws.5
The crucial diﬀerence between mergers and RJVs consists in the behavior of ﬁrms in
the product market. Whereas in RJVs ﬁrms make their production decisions indepen-
dently, by deﬁnition ﬁrms act cooperatively in mergers.6 A merger enables insiders to
3See further Katz and Ordover (1990), and Jacquemin (1988).
4Widely cited theoretical contributions are Brander and Spence (1983), Spence (1984), Katz (1986),
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992). See DeBondt (1996) for a
survey on the literature on spillovers and innovative activity. Empirical studies predominantly analyzed
the determinants of RJV formation, as well as their impact on R&D investment, and proﬁtability. For the
determinants of RJVs see Cassiman and Veugelers (1999), R¨ oller, Siebert and Tombak (2000) or Kaiser
(2002) among others, and for the eﬀects on R&D spending or patenting activity, see Irwin and Klenow
(1996) and Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) among others.
5In the European Union, treatment of RJVs is also generally favorable. Under certain restrictions,
there is a block exemption for R&D cooperation if the combined market shares of the cooperating ﬁrms are
no greater than 25%. Even if a proposed R&D cooperation does not fall under the block exemption, it may
nonetheless be permitted under Article 81(3) of the EU Treaty. There are also a number of government
sponsored R&D projects worldwide, e.g. Sematech (Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology) in the
USA, VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated Circuits) in Japan or the Fifth Framework Programme in the
EU.
6Note, however that RJVs may increase the possibility of collusion in the product market (see Martin,
2internalize the competitive externality in the product market and insiders reduce their
production inducing market price to increase (market power eﬀect).
Prominent contributions on the eﬀe c t so nm e r g e r sa r ep r i m a r i l yb a s e do nn u m e r i c a l
methods, see e.g. Berry and Pakes (1993), Gowrisankaran (1999), Dockner and Gauners-
dorfer (2001) and Werden and Froeb (1994). However, empirical evidence on the eﬀects
o fm e r g e r so rR J V so nc o s te ﬃciencies or market power is rather scant.7 Up to date,
there are only four studies that estimate the eﬀects of mergers by using market shares.8
Goldberg (1973) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant change in market shares of 44 companies acquired in
the 50ies and 60ies in the (median three and a half) years following the merger. Bald-
win and Gorecki (1990) ﬁnd signiﬁcant declines in market shares for plants acquired in
horizontal mergers. Mueller (1985), the most ambituous study of mergers and market
share, uses FTC market share data for the 1,000 largest companies in 1950 and 1972. His
results indicate that while control-group ﬁrms (selected on the basis of industry and size)
retained 55% of their 1950 market share in 1972, ﬁrms undertaking horizontal mergers
retained only 14% of their 1950 market share. Pesendorfer (2003) found that 74.1 % of
merging ﬁrms lost on market shares. One diﬃcult, but important aspect in analyzing
mergers is to account for endogeneity problems in merger formation. We are not aware
of any study analyzing the eﬀe c t so fR J V so nm a r k e ts h a r e s .
Our theoretical framework in analyzing the net eﬀects of mergers and RJVs follows
1995).
7For more empirical studies analyzing the eﬀects of mergers on proﬁtability or sales growth, see,
among others, Mueller (1980), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Gugler et al. (2003). For an overview
of contemporary empirical merger analysis, see Baker (1997).
8The evaluation of market shares has several signiﬁcant advantages. Among others, they allow to
implicitly derive the eﬃciency and market power eﬀects without using cost data. Cost data, e.g. ﬁxed or
sunk costs, are diﬃcult to disentangle or to explicitly refer to a certain industry, like the semiconductor
industry. For example, many semiconductor ﬁrms like IBM, Siemens and Toshiba are prevalent in many
industries. Therefore, it is rather diﬃcult to refer part of their ﬁxed costs to the semiconductor industry.
Another advantage from inferring the eﬃciencies from the reallocation of pre- and post-merger equilibrium
market shares is that we avoid solving for equilibrium quantities in closed-form solutions, which is a
diﬃcult task, even for very simple oligopoly models.
3Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Most commonly used models of oligopoly predict that if the
market power eﬀect outweighs any eﬃciency gains due to a merger, the market share of
the merged ﬁrm drops relative to the sum of the market shares of acquiring and target ﬁrm
before the merger, and market price increases. In contrast, if a merger generates suﬃcient
cost synergies to outweigh the market power eﬀect, the merging ﬁrms’ market share will
increase, inducing price to decline and consumer welfare to increase. For example, in a
Cournot model with homogenous products, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) implicitly derive
the cost eﬃciencies, which are necessary for price to decline, from the change of merging
ﬁrms’ market shares. In the Appendix we show that results hold up when allowing for
diﬀerentiated products.9
We empirically analyze the eﬃciency versus market power eﬀects of mergers and RJVs
in one of the most important high-technology industries, the semiconductor industry,
during the period 1989 to 1999. This industry is characterized by a high degree of process
and product innovation as well as high capital intensity. For example, the semiconductor
companies rank highest in spending R&D as a percentage of sales (13%), outranking the
drug, computer and other industries. The number of US-patent applications increases by
approximately 16% every year, from 2,196 in 1989 to 6,036 in 1996 (see Hall, Jaﬀea n d
Trajtenberg, 2001). The worldwide total revenues of the semiconductor industry reached
168.9 Billion USD in 1999, compared to 52.7 Billion USD in 1989.
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we follow previous studies and
estimate a standard OLS merger/RJV eﬀects regression by the introduction of dummy
variables. Second, to account for the endogeneity of the merger/RJV formation, we esti-
mate an endogenous switching model. In its ﬁrst step, this model isolates the exogenous
determinants of mergers/RJVs, e.g. the size and innovativeness of the ﬁrm etc., as well
as endogenous factors, i.e. the predicted market shares under the diﬀerent regimes. Its
second step, the eﬀects regression, provides consistent estimates of the net eﬀects of the
mergers/RJVs on market shares, while accounting for endogenous selection. We apply
9Other merger studies investigating diﬀerentiated product markets in combination with price compe-
tition are e.g. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Werden and Froeb (1994).
4these estimation procedures to the 4-digit (3344 NAICS) semiconductor industry, as well
as to the 6-digit (334418 NAICS) memory and the 6-digit (334413 NAICS) microcompo-
nents industry.
We ﬁnd for all three industry-levels that mergers raise the market share of participating
ﬁrms as do RJVs, providing evidence that eﬃciency eﬀects dominate market power eﬀects
for both forms of cooperation. However, we also ﬁnd that the eﬃciency gains caused by
mergers may have been achieved by RJVs as well. Therefore, RJVs often represent viable
alternatives to mergers from the consumer welfare point of view.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our dataset on mergers and
RJVs in the semiconductor industry. In Section 3, we apply the empirical analysis, and
we conclude in Section 4. The Appendix presents an extension of the theoretical model
by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), which allows for product diﬀerentiation and provides the
basis for our empirical part.
2 The Industry Description and Data
Firms’ annual market shares in the semiconductor industry are provided by Gartner
Group. This company collects production data for each ﬁrm operating in the semiconduc-
tor industry on an annual basis. Thus, we do not need to rely on accounting information
to infer market shares. The data source for research joint ventures and mergers is the
Thompson Financial Securities Database. This database includes alliances with a deal
value of more than 1 Mio. USD ensuring that the overwhelming majority of mergers and
research joint ventures is covered.
The semiconductor industry is one of the most important high-technology industries.
According to Jorgenson (2001), the semiconductor markets are especially important as
their prices have signiﬁcant impact on many other downstream industries, such as the
computer, automobiles, and communications industry. Semiconductors are mainly used
as inputs for the computer industry (45% of its sales), consumer electronics (23%), and
communications equipment (13%). The semiconductor market consists of memory chips,
5micro components, and other components such as logic devices. The industry is charac-
terized by worldwide selling companies mainly from the United States, Japan, Europe,
and other countries in the Asian-Paciﬁc region, with a 39.6%, 40.1%, 8.5%, and 11.8%
market share, respectively (Dataquest, 1999). The international production rates vary
drastically depending on the type of semiconductor component (see Table 1a).10
Tables 1b-d display statistics on industry revenues and number of ﬁrms in the semi-
conductor industry as a whole, as well as the memory and the microcomponents segments,
of all ﬁrms producing for at least one year in the semiconductor industry worldwide from
1989 to 1999. In the 1990s, competition in the semiconductor industry increased dramat-
ically, brought on by the larger number of ﬁrms, which rose from 132 in 1989 to 188 in
1998 (see Table 1b). The semiconductor industry generated annually 107,402 Mio. US-$
on average from 1989 to 1999. The Herﬁndahl index is around 400, with the HHI being
much larger in the microcomponents (more than 2000 in the last two years) than in the
memory segment.11
T h em e m o r ya n dt h em i c r o c o m p o n e n t sm a rkets make up for 50% of the sales in the
semiconductor industry, with each generating between 25 and 30 billion US-$, on average.
The microcomponents segment grew much faster than the memory segment over the
period of investigation: While the share of the memory segment in total semiconductors
fell from 27.5% in 1989 to 20.4% in 1999, the share of the microcomponents segment
increased from 14.8% to 33.7% during the same time period.
On average, 54 ﬁrms operated in the memory and 75 ﬁrms in the microcomponents
segment in a given year during the 1989-1999 period. Again time trends are interesting:
while the number of ﬁrms stayed nearly constant in the memory segment, the microcom-
ponents segment is characterized by positive net entry over the 1989-1999 period (the
10For more industry descriptions, see Irwin and Klenow (1994 and 1996), Flamm (1996) and Gruber
(1992 and 1996).
11According to the US Merger Guidelines mergers are generally not challenged when the HHI is smaller
than 1000, when the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 and the merger
will increase the HHI by less than 100 points, or when the HHI is larger than 1800 and the merger will
increase the HHI by less than 50 points. All other mergers might be challenged.
6number of ﬁrms increased from 51 in 1989 to 88 in 1999).
A higher competitive pressure increased the technological pace resulting in shorter
life cycles over time, see Jorgenson (2001). As the semiconductor industry is heavily
capital-intensive, strategic alliances like mergers and RJVs became increasingly important
during the 90’s. Prominent examples are SEMATECH, MITI and ESPRIT, consortia
established by the U.S., Japan and Europe in order to promote the technological pace
and the development of semiconductor chips, see also Song (2003). Table 2 presents
statistics on the number of completed deals. There are 111 horizontal mergers and 244
RJVs (actually RJV years) during the 1989-1999 period. A research joint venture is
deﬁned to operate in the semiconductor industry if the main objective of the research
refers to the NAICS 3344. On average 2.92 ﬁrms participate in an RJV.12 As i m i l a r
number of RJVs have been formed in the memory and the microcomponents industry (57
and 63, respectively), while the number of mergers taken place in the microcomponents
industry is much higher with 53 than in the memory industry with 34.
Tables 3a-c present summary statistics on market shares of ﬁrms participating in merg-
ers and RJVs for the semiconductor, memory and microcomponents industry. As shown
in Table 3a, acquiring ﬁrms in a merger have a mean market share in the semiconductor
industry of 2.5% in the year before the merger, while their targets are considerably smaller
(mean 0.3%). The average (median) market share of RJV ﬁr m si s3 . 1 5 % . 13 Both groups
of ﬁrms are able to expand their market shares until t + 3. Tables 3b-c reveal that RJV
ﬁrms experience increases in market shares in both sub-segments, while merging ﬁrms’
market shares increase only in the microcomponents segment post merger.
12This is consistent with the notion that the potential beneﬁcial eﬀe c t so fR J V si n c r e a s ew i t ht h e
number of participating ﬁrms, since technological spillovers increase (see Baumol, 2001).
13This is consistent with the notion by Irwin and Klenow (1996), that larger ﬁrms gain more from
RJVs and from R&D knowledge spillovers.
73 The Empirics
In line with Farrell and Shapiro (1990) one way to quantify the market power versus
eﬃciency eﬀects of mergers and RJVs, is to compare pre-merger with post-merger market
shares, see also our extension in the Appendix. More precisely, if the sum of the market
shares of merger or RJV insiders increase following a merger or the formation of an RJV,
the eﬃciency gains created by the merger/RJV overcompensate the (potential) market
power eﬀects, and price will necessarily decline. This holds for any degree of product
diﬀerentiation in the market. Therefore, in what follows we establish the desirability of
m e r g e r so rR J V sb ya n a l y z i n gt h e i re ﬀects on market shares.
3.1 A Dummy Variable Approach
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the following dummy variable model:
sci,t = ac + b · sci,t−x−1 +
x X
y=0
my · Mergeri,t−y +
x X
y=0
ry · RJVi,t−y +  i,t (1)
for i =1...263 and t =1 9 8 9...1999. If there is no merger, sci,t is simply the market
share of ﬁrm i in period t. If there is a merger, sci,t is the sum of the market shares of
the acquiring and acquired company, i.e. the combined market share, before the merger,
and the market share of the acquiring ﬁrm after merger. The parameters ac are coun-
try/country group dummies for the USA, Europe, Japan and South Korea. In order to test
f o rm a r k e tp o w e ra n de ﬃciency eﬀects of mergers and RJVs, we investigate the change
of insiders’ and outsiders’ market shares by using a dummy variable approach: we deﬁne
Mergeri,t−y =1 ,i fﬁrm i took over another ﬁrm in period t − y, and zero elsewise, or by
analogy, RJVi,t−y =1 ,i fﬁrm i participated in a research joint venture in period t−y,a n d
zero elsewise.14 The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable sci,t−x−1 eﬀectuates that
the coeﬃcients on the dummy variables measure changes in market shares. Equation (1)
14It should be noted, that there are only two ﬁrm years where there is both a merger and an RJV.
Thus, multicollinearity among the merger and RJV dummies is no problem.
8is estimated separately for the diﬀerent lag parameters x =0 ,1,2,3. Thus, we determine
the impact of mergers and RJVs up to three years after the deals. For example, the




A positive sum of coeﬃcients on the dummy variables indicate that the eﬃciency eﬀect
dominates the market power eﬀect.
Unit root tests indicate that the stochastic market share data generating process is
stationary. Dickey-Fuller as well as augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reject the null hypoth-
esis that market share contains a unit root. The t-values for the coeﬃcient of the lagged
dependent variable in regressions of the ﬁrst diﬀerence of market share on market share
lagged by one period range from −5.45 (pooled OLS), −6.12 (OLS ﬁxed eﬀects) to −6.26
(IV method of Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).15 Thus, these values are above the 1% critical
values as e.g. tabulated by Fuller (1976). Since market shares are I(0), least squares
provides
√
T consistent estimates for the parameters of interest, however these estimators
will be biased for small T. In particular, the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable
will be biased downwards, towards zero. Therefore, we instrument sci,t−x−1 by the stock of
patents in the semiconductor industry by ﬁrm i as of year t−1−x and estimate by 2SLS.
The ﬁrm’s patents stock is supposed to capture eﬃciency diﬀerences between ﬁrms and
appears to be a suitable instrument, since the simple correlation coeﬃcient with market
share is 0.61 (p =0 .001) and the correlation coeﬃcient with the residuals of equation (1)
is near zero.
Table 4 reports the regression results for equation (1). As shown, mergers signiﬁcantly
increase the market share of the combined entity relative to pre-merger levels in the semi-
conductor industry. The cumulative eﬀe c to fm e r g e r so nm a r k e ts h a r e si s+ 1 .0 percentage
points (t =7 .22) three years after the merger (x = 3). The results also indicate that RJVs
signiﬁcantly increase the market shares of participating ﬁrms. RJVs signiﬁcantly aﬀect
15The method of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) involves ﬁrst diﬀerencing to account for unobserved ﬁrm
level heterogeneity and then instrumenting ∆yi,t−1 by ∆yi,t−2 and/or yi,t−2, which are valid instruments
since they are correlated with ∆yi,t−1 but uncorrelated with ∆µit. The Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
estimator is consistent when N −→ ∞ or T −→ ∞ or both.
9market share in the second and third years after formation (see columns for x =3 ) .T h e
cumulative eﬀects of RJVs on market share of the participating ﬁr m si s0 .52 percentage
points with a t-value of 3.33. As 2.92 ﬁrms form an RJV on average, the cumulative
increase in market share is 1.5 percentage points three years after the formation. While
we cannot assure that RJVs do not lead to collusion in the product market, we can state
that the eﬃciency eﬀects of RJVs more than outweigh any potential anti-competitive ef-
fects. Our results imply that mergers and RJVs raise the market shares of participating
ﬁrms. This points to an eﬃciency increasing role of mergers and RJVs. However, RJVs
raise market shares of participants by 0.5 percentage points more, collectively. Moreover,
from Table 4 and x = 3, mergers have a negative (albeit insigniﬁcant) eﬀe c ti ny e a rt h r e e
after the merger, while RJVs still positively and signiﬁcantly inﬂuence market shares of
insiders. This suggests that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of RJVs are longer-lasting than those of
mergers.
The country dummy variables (jointly signiﬁcant beyond the 1% level) indicate that
Japanese semiconductor ﬁrms signiﬁcantly lost market shares relative to all other countries
depicted during the 90ies (they lost on average 0.14% per annum), while South Korean
semiconductor ﬁrms signiﬁcantly improved their relative market position (on average they
gained 0.13% per annum). US and European semiconductor ﬁrms were about equally
successful in retaining their market share. This is consistent with popular opinion.
Equation (1) is robust to the following modiﬁcations. (1) Our dummy variable method-
ology treats each RJV-year symmetrically, however some ﬁrms form more than one joint
venture in a given year. If we include the number of RJVs formed in a given year as
a count variable, the results are virtually identical to the ones obtained by introducing
dummies. (2) Results are also nearly identical if we estimate equation (1) by OLS instead
of 2SLS or in ﬁrst-diﬀerence form instead of including a lagged dependent variable. (3)
Finally, the results are qualitatively identical if we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and estimate
the dynamic panel by the IV method of Anderson and Hsiao (1982). RJVs and mergers
continue to signiﬁcantly increase the market shares of ﬁrms in the semiconductor industry.
103.2 Endogenous Switching
The main criticism of mergers or RJV studies is that the endogeneity of the merger/RJV
formation is not accounted for. If the errors in the selection equation and the market
share equations are correlated we get a simultaneity bias in our parameters of interest. For
example, it may happen that mergers or RJVs are formed among more productive ﬁrms,
which will - even without merger/RJV - gain on market share in the future. A comparison
with outsider ﬁrms may indicate increasing market shares due to the merger/RJV, which is
in fact due to the higher productivity, not being related to the merger. In other words, the
within ﬁrm variation in merger or joint venture activity may be (partially) endogenously
determined, and merger or RJV years are a self-selected sample of observations. We
account for endogeneity by estimating the following endogenous switching model, which
asks to what extent the ﬁrms were able to retain their pre-merger (pre-RJV) market
shares (see Mueller (1985), the endogenous switching model is in line with Lee, 1978):
I
∗
i,t = b0 + b1(scm,i,t − scnm,i,t)+b2 · Xi,t − vi,t
scm,i,t = am,0 + am,1 · scm,i,t−x−1 + εm,i,t (2)
scnm,i,t = anm,0 + anm,1 · scnm,i,t−x−1 + εnm,i,t (3)
Equation (2) is a selection equation that determines whether or not the ﬁrm takes
over another ﬁrm in year t (forms an RJV). Note, that ﬁrm i’s decision to merge/form
an RJV depends on the comparison of the expected market shares when it cooperates
(merges) versus when it does not cooperate (merge). Variable X is a set of exogenous
variables determining merger/RJV formation. Variables are deﬁned as before, with the
subscript m referring to merging observations and subscript nm referring to non-merging
observations. Variables for the RJV estimations are determined by analogy.
If I∗
i,t > 0, the ﬁrm forms a merger (RJV), and the market share is determined by
equation (2), otherwise its market share isd e t e r m i n e db ye q u a t i o n( 3 ) . T h e r ea r et w o
problems with estimating the set of equations. First, we have a missing data problem. We
only observe the market share given the chosen regime, that is, we observe scm,i,t if I∗
i,t > 0,
11or scnm,i,t otherwise, but never both. Secondly, we have a simultaneity problem, and OLS
estimation of equations (2) and (3) gives inconsistent estimates, because E(εm,i,t|I∗
i,t >
0)6=0a n dE ( εnm,i,t|I∗
i,t ≤ 0)6=0 . Thus, we substitute equations (2) and (3) into equation
(2), and estimate the “reduced form” probit by ML. From this estimation, we retrieve
the inverse Mills ratio and estimate equations (2) and (3) consistently with 2SLS.16 Using
these estimates to calculate the predicted diﬀerence in market shares for the two regimes,
plugging those into the “structural” probit equation (2), and estimating the whole system
by ML, one gets consistent estimates of the a0s and b0s. The parameters of main interest
are am,1 and anm,1, i.e. the percentage of market share retained of merging versus non-
merging ﬁrms (RJV forming versus non-RJV forming ﬁrms) after x years, taking into
account the endogenous nature of merger/RJV formation.
The set of exogenous drivers of merger/RJV formation include the following variables,
which we group into ﬁrm (1-3), time (4) and country speciﬁc (5). All of them are proxies
in one form or the other of the costs and beneﬁts of undertaking a merger or being member
in an RJV.
(1) The number of accumulated patents of ﬁrm i until period t (Patents): The eﬃ-
ciency with which ﬁr m si n n o v a t ei sl i k e l yt ob eas i g n i ﬁcant determinant of merger or RJV
formation. For example, absorptive capacity plays an important role in the R&D process
(see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). In an RJV (the ”make” decision) ﬁrms may better cap-
ture spillovers from the other participating ﬁrms, the more patents they possess, if these
proxy for absorptive capacity. Thus complementary aspects of the innovation process
may prevail in RJVs (positive sign prediction). In a merger (the “buy” decision), on the
other hand, R&D capacity may actually be brougth “in house” to rectify own shortcom-
ings (negative sign prediction). See Blonigen and Taylor (2000) for recent evidence on a
negative relation between R&D and acquisition activity in high-tech industries.
(2) The size of the ﬁrm (Size): Nearly all studies on mergers or RJVs as well as our
summary statistics indicate that the size of the ﬁrm is a major determinant of its M&A
16We again use the accumulated number of patents in the semiconductor industry of ﬁrm i in year
t − x − 1 as instrument for market shares in t − x − 1.
12and other cooperative activity. For example, larger ﬁrms are much more likely to be
the aquirers in merger deals, and larger ﬁrms potentially beneﬁt more from innovation,
e.g. because they can apply a given marginal cost reduction to a larger number of units.
We therefore include an absolute size measure, total assets of ﬁrm i in period t,i n t ot h e
determinants speciﬁcation, and expect a positive sign for both the merger and the RJV
equation.
(3) The ”scope” of the ﬁrm (Multi): The propensity to merge/form an RJV may
depend on the ”scope” of the ﬁrm, that is whether a ﬁrm operates in more than one
segment of the semiconductor industry (Multi=1) o rw h e t h e ri ti sf o c u s e di no n es e g m e n t
(Multi=0). We distinguish between the ”memory”, ”microcomponents” and ”other” seg-
ments of the semiconductor industry, the mean Multi is 33.0%. Multi-market ﬁrms are
expected to both have a higher propensity to take over another ﬁrm, e.g. because there
are more synergies to be achieved, and form more RJVs, e.g. because spillovers can be
better appropriated, than more focused ﬁrms.
( 4 )Y e a re ﬀects: Several time-speciﬁc factors in the semiconductor industry may inﬂu-
ence the propensity to merge/form an RJV. For example, one stylized fact in the merger
literature is that mergers come in waves (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 2001, or Gugler
et al., 2003). The concentration in the industry may inﬂuence takeover activity and may
change over time. Likewise, the number of ﬁrms and the turbulence in the industry (entry
and exit) aﬀect mergers and RJVs. Since we would have only (at most) eleven indepen-
dent observations on these variables, and since there are endogeneity problems with some
of them (e.g. concentration), we chose to include a full set of yearly time dummies in-
stead. These account for any time-speciﬁc factors driving merger and RJV activity and
are exogenous.
(5) The costs and beneﬁts of merging or forming an RJV may also depend on the
country/country group the ﬁrms stem from. For example, the legal environment or public
policy may diﬀer. Thus, we include the country(-group) dummies USA, Europe, Japan
and South Korea.
The selection of the determinants variables 1-5 are very much in line with previous
13studies. Table 5 presents the switching estimation results for x = 3, i.e. until three
years after formation. The merger and RJV selection estimations from the “structural”
probit equation show that merger/RJV formation indeed is signiﬁcantly determined by
the expected gains in market shares. Thus, ﬁrms expecting that a merger/RJV will
increase their market shares are signiﬁcantly more likely to actually take over another
ﬁrm/form an RJV.
Turning to the exogenous determinants X,w eﬁnd the following results: While own
patents signiﬁcantly negatively inﬂuence the decision to merge, they signiﬁcantly pos-
itively inﬂuence the decision to form an RJV. This is consistent with RJVs being the
“make” decision, where complementary aspects of the innovation process prevail, and
mergers, the “buy” decision, are used to acquire external knowledge to substitute for own
deﬁciencies. As expected, the size of the ﬁrm as well as its multi-market nature positively
aﬀect the probability to merge and to form an RJV. The year dummies are signiﬁcant
determinants of both the decision to merge as well as to be member in an RJV, while
the country dummies are only signiﬁcant in the determinants of merger equation. This
is consistent with time varying industry factors aﬀecting the optimality to cooperate. It
appears that regulation and/or public policy diﬀers more for mergers than for RJVs across
countries/county groups.
Having accounted for the endogenous formation, we are able to consistently estimate
t h eq u a n t i t a t i v ee ﬀects of the mergers or RJVs. As we see from the eﬀects regressions
merging ﬁrms are able to expand their market share by 19% three years after a merger as
compared to non-merging ﬁrms loosing nearly 14% during that period, on average. RJV
participating ﬁrms are able to expand their market share by nearly 10% three years after
the formation of an RJV as compared to non-RJV ﬁrms loosing more than 12% during
that period, on average. These numbers are very much in line with the estimates from
section 3.1 using a dummy variable technique and ignoring endogenous switching. In sum,
while mergers and RJVs are to some extent endogenously determined, our main results
are not altered by explicitly considering and correcting for this endogeneity.
143.3 Level of Aggregation
So far we have analyzed mergers and RJVs at the 4-digit NAICS level of aggregation,
the semiconductor industry. One may argue that the kinds of eﬃciency eﬀects that ﬁrms
achieve via cooperation should manifest themselves much more clearly at much lower
levels of aggregation, e.g. the 6-digit level.17 Thus, in this section we test for robustness
of our ﬁndings at the 6-digit level of aggregation, i.e. the memory and microcomponents
markets.
For these two cleanly delineated markets, we re-estimate system (2) to (4). This proce-
dure implies that the degree of horizontality of our mergers and RJVs is now even tighter,
since now a horizontal merger or RJV is between ﬁrms e.g. in the microcomponents
market. By analogy, market shares, patents etc. are re-deﬁned.
Table 6 presents the estimates for system (2) to (4) for the microcomponents, and Table
7 for the memory segment. The results for the determinants equations are similar to the
semiconductor industry as a whole. For example, the size and multi-market variables
again carry a positive sign, indicating that scale and scope eﬀects are important factors
determining the formation of a merger/RJV at the lower level of aggregation. However,
these eﬀects are at lower signiﬁcance levels than in the total semiconductor industry,
which is not surprising given the lower number of observations.
Mergers and RJVs are particularly beneﬁcial in the microcomponents segment. Here,
merging ﬁrms can raise their market share by 25%, RJV participating ﬁrms by 15.3%.
Results for the memory market diﬀer from those for the microcomponents market in so
f a rt h a tm e r g e r sd on o tr a i s em a r k e ts h a r e sf o rm e r g i n gﬁrms, while RJVs continue to
have positive net eﬃciencies.
In summary, these results show that our ﬁndings of positive net eﬃciencies of mergers
and RJVs for the semiconductor industry are robust and continue to hold for the micro-
17However, some eﬃciency or market power eﬀects are realized at rather higher levels of aggregation.
For example, reductions of ﬁxed costs or economies of scope may be realized at the ﬁrm level. Similarly,
market power can stem from multi-market conduct or vertical relationships. Thus a too narrow scope
may underestimate these eﬀects.
15components and memory markets. Our results for mergers apply most signiﬁcantly for
the microcomponents market.18
4C o n c l u s i o n
Our study contributes to merger and RJV control policy. A merger may be approved
based on a so-called “eﬃciency defence”:I fﬁrms can convince merger control authorities
that the eﬃciencies generated by the merger more than outweigh the anti-competitive
eﬀects, the merger may be cleared. An important aspect in clearing mergers is that the
eﬃciencies are merger-speciﬁc. That is, that the eﬃciencies cannot be achieved by any
other means with comparable or lower anti-competitive eﬀects, such as RJVs.
This study ﬁnds that mergers increase the market shares of participating ﬁrms. This
points to an eﬃciency enhancing role of mergers. However, we also ﬁnd that RJVs are
indeed viable alternatives to mergers. Cumulatively, RJVs raise insiders’ market shares
by more than a merger and achieve higher eﬃciency gains and consumer welfare. This
result is robust to endogenous merger or RJV formation. We conclude that eﬃciency
gains are frequently not merger-speciﬁc, given the possibility of a research joint venture.
At least two important caveats must be mentioned, however. First, we did not analyze
other forms of joint ventures such as pure production joint ventures. It may well be that
these forms of cooperation increase collusion in the product market without oﬀsetting
eﬃciency advantages. Second, our analysis is restricted to the semiconductor industry,
one of the most R&D intensive and innovative industries. Moreover, results for the mi-
crocomponents segment are much clearer than for the memory segment, which was in
relative decline during the period of investigation. Future research is needed to conﬁrm
our main result - RJVs are often viable alternatives to mergers - for other industries, as
to establish more insight for antitrust control authorities and the evaluation of consumer
18This shows that a rigid application of a market share or Herfrindahl criterion to determine the




In this section, we show that the results by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) are robust to product
diﬀerentiation. We consider N ﬁrms, each producing a single good. The goods are diﬀerentiated
and the inverse demand function for ﬁrm i is





where Pi denotes the price of ﬁrm i,a n dqi the quantity it produces. The substitutability
parameter is g with 0 ≤ g ≤ b.W h e ng =0goods are totally diﬀerentiated and become closer
substitutes the larger g,w h e ng = b products are perfect substitutes. We allow production
being proﬁtable, hence a>c ,and assume that no entry or exit occurs.
We consider two diﬀerent types of coalitions. (1) Research Joint Ventures, where ﬁrms
cooperate in R&D but not in the product market, and (2) mergers, where ﬁrms combine their
assets and cooperate in the R&D and the product market. In every type there are two groups
of ﬁrms, the M ≤ N insiders, which participate in the coalition, and the N − M outsiders.
Through eﬃciency gains the insiders (I) may achieve lower ex post marginal costs than the
outsiders (O), cI <c O.
Following Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we assume that cooperations occur only when they are
proﬁtable. Thus, we do not endogenize the coalition process and do not investigate the eﬀect on
insiders’ proﬁts. In the product market, ﬁrms simultaneously choose their quantities. We ﬁrst
analyze the maximization problem for the outsiders, which is identical under merger and RJV,
before we turn to the objectives for insiders in a merger and RJV, respectively.
175.1 The Outsiders













































,i = M +1 ,...,N
where qO
i and qI
j, j =1 ,...,M, are the outputs of an outsider and insider ﬁrm, respectively.
5.2 The Insiders in a Merger
Assuming symmetry among the M insiders in a merger (m), they maximize joint proﬁts, given
by (nm are the outsiders of the merger):19
max
qm Mπ
































Solving for the equilibrium quantities and rearranging yields the following relation








Let us suppose that the merger generates no eﬃciency gains (cm = cnm), such that only the
market power eﬀect is present. When products are perfect substitutes (g = b), Mq∗m = q∗nm,
and we can conﬁrm the results established by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), that the
insiders reduce their production by so much that Cournot symmetry is again established in the
post-merger equilibrium. Outsiders react by increasing their output, but by less than insiders
reduced their output, and industry output declines and market price increases.
As products become more diﬀerentiated (g declines), insiders impose fewer negative exter-





It follows that insiders gain less on market power inducing a lower increase in industry price.
When products are totally diﬀerentiated (g =0 ) , insider and outsider ﬁrms do not change
output (q∗m = q∗nm).T h i si si n t u i t i v e ,s i n c eﬁrms already behaved like monopolists before the
19Note, that an aquiror may have an incentive to increase its product portfeuille by taking
over another ﬁrm. The assumption of jointly maximizing proﬁts would meet this incentive.
18merger and did not impose any externalities in the product market on each other. Hence, there
is no further gain of market power and the industry price remains the same.
In case the merger creates eﬃciency gains (cm <c nm), and considering perfect substitutes
(g = b), equation (4) results in Mq∗m = cnm−cm
b + q∗nm.I f t h e e ﬃciency gains due to the
merger are suﬃciently high, they may outweigh the market power eﬀect, such that insiders
increase output and prices decline. When products become more diﬀerentiated (g declines), the
same argument as above holds and insiders decrease their output by less.
We can impose the following result: When the eﬃciency eﬀect induced by the merger is
suﬃciently large, such that it dominates the market power eﬀect, a single insider ﬁrm will
produce a higher quantity than an outsider and industry price declines compared to the pre-
merger price. Moreover, the more the products are diﬀerentiated, the lower eﬃciency gains are
needed to overcompensate the market power eﬀect. We have thus shown that the predictions
by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) on market shares and prices are robust to any degree of product
diﬀerentiation.
5.3 The Insiders in an RJV













































where nR denote non-RJV ﬁrms (outsiders). Solving for the corresponding equilibrium quanti-











generated by the RJV, the more the insiders will




. Insiders will increase their output
less, the more the products are diﬀerentiated. The outsiders respond by decreasing their output,
but by less, resulting in a decline in industry price. Note that this argument holds under the
assumption that ﬁrms do not collude in the product market. If RJV ﬁrms do collude in the
product market, an RJV behaves like a merger and the same logic as above applies.
19Summarizing, we can infer the extent to which mergers or RJVs generate eﬃciency eﬀects by
analyzing the change of pre- to post merger (RJV) market shares. If the insiders’ post-merger
(RJV) shares increase compared to pre-merger (RJV) shares, the eﬃciency gains overcompensate
the (potential) market power eﬀects, and price will necessarily decline.20 This holds for any
degree of product diﬀerentiation.
20The likely consequences of allowing for entry and exit are the following: Market shares of
insiders would increase by more if the eﬃciency eﬀect dominates the market power eﬀect, since
some outsiders would exit. Market shares of insiders would decrease by more if the market power
eﬀect dominates the eﬃciency eﬀect, since other ﬁrms may enter. Thus, the assumption of no
entry and exit in our study makes the analysis even more conservative. See Werden and Froeb
(1998) for an analysis of the entry-inducing eﬀects of mergers. See also R¨ oller and Stahl (2002)
for the welfare eﬀects of mergers and joint ventures.
206 References
Anderson, T.W. and C. Hsiao, 1982, “Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Com-
ponents”, Journal of the American Statistical Association 76, 598—606.
Baker, J.B., 1997, “Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis”, speech published in
George Mason University Law Review, vol. 5, pp. 347-61.
Baldwin, J. and P.A. Gorecki, 1990, “Mergers Placed in the Context of Firm Turnover”,
in Bureau of the Census, 1990 Annual Research Conference, Proceedings, Washing-
ton D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 53—73.
Baumol, W.J., 2001, “When is inter-ﬁrm coordination beneﬁcial? The case of innova-
tion”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 727—737.
Berry, S. and A. Pakes, 1993, “Some Applications and Limitations of Recent Advances in
Empirical Industrial Organization: Merger Analysis”, American Economic Review,
Vol. 83, No. 2, 247—252.
Blonigen, B.A. and C.T. Taylor, 2000, “R&D Intensity and Acquisition in High-Technology
Industries: Evidence from the US Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industries,
J o u r n a lo fI n d u s t r i a lE c o n o m i c s ,V o l .X L V I I I ,N o .1 ,4 7 — 7 0 .
Brander, J.A. and B. Spencer, 1983, “Strategic Commitment with R&D: the Symmetric
Case”, Bell Journal of Economics 14, 225—235.
Branstetter, L. G. and M. Sakakibara, 2002, “When Do Research Consortia Work Well
and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data”, American Economic Review,
Vol. 92, No. 1, 143—159.
Cassiman, B. and R. Veugelers, 1999, “R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical
Evidence”, CEPR discussion paper 2330.
Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal, 1989, “Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of
R&D”, The Economic Journal 99, 569—596.
21D’Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin, 1988, “Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D in
Duopoly with Spillovers”, The American Economic Review 78, 1133—1137.
Dataquest, 1999, Semiconductor Data partly provided by Dataquest.
DeBondt, R., 1997, “Spillovers and Innovative Activities”, International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization 15, 1—28.
Deneckere, R. and C. Davidson, 1985, “Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand
Competition,” Rand Journal of Economics, 16, 473—486.
Dockner, E.J. and A. Gaunersdorfer, 2001, “On the Proﬁtability of Horizontal ‘ Mergers
in Industries with Dynamic Competition,” Japan and the World Economy, 13, 195—
216.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro, 1990, “Horizontal Merger: An Equilibrium Analysis”, Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, 107—126.
Flamm, K., 1996, “Mismanaged Trade?”, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.
Fuller, W.A., 1976, “Introduction to Statistical Time Series”, J. Wiley & Sons, Inc., New
York.
Goldberg, L., 1973, “The Eﬀect of Conglomerate Mergers on Competition”, Journal of
Law and Economics, 16, 137—158.
Gowrisankaran, G., 1999, “A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers” RAND
Journal of Economics, Spring, Vol. 30(1), 56-83.
Gruber, H., 1992, “The Learning Curve in the Production of Semiconductors Memory
Chips”, Applied Economics, 24, pp. 885-894.
Gruber, H., 1996, “Trade Policy and Learning by Doing: The Case of Semiconductors”,
Research Policy, 25, pp. 723-739.
22Gugler, K., Mueller, D. C. and Yurtoglu, B.B., 2003, ”The Determinants of Merger
Waves”, University of Vienna, presented at the EARIE 2003 meeting in Helsinki.
Gugler, K., D.C. Mueller, B.B. Yurtoglu and C. Zulehner, 2003, “The Eﬀects of Mergers:
An International Comparison”, International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Vol. 21 (5), 625-653.
Hall, B.H., A.B. Jaﬀe and M. Trajtenberg, 2001, “The NBER Patent Citation Data File:
Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools” NBER Working Paper No. 8498.
Irwin, D. and P. Klenow, 1994, “Learning by Doing Spillovers in the Semiconductor
Industry”, Journal of Political Economy, 102, pp. 1200-1227.
Irwin, D.A. and P.J. Klenow, 1996, “High-tech R&D Subsidies: Estimating the Eﬀects
of Sematech”, Journal of International Economics 40, 323—344.
Jacquemin, A., 1988, “Cooperative Agreements in R&D and European Antitrust Policy”,
European Economic Review 32, 551—569.
Jorgenson, D.W., 2001, “Information Technology and the U.S. Economy”, American
Economic Review, Vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 1-32.
Jorde, T.M. and D.J. Teece, 1990, “Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for An-
titrust”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, 75—96.
Kaiser, U., 2002, “An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and re-
search cooperation : evidence for the German Service sector”, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 20, 747—774.
Kamien, M.I., E. Muller and I. Zang, 1992, “Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels”,
American Economic Review 82, 1293—1306.
Katz, M., 1986, “An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development”, Rand Journal
of Economics 17, 527—543.
23Katz, M. and J. Ordover, 1990, “R&D Cooperation and Competition”, Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, 137—191.
Lee, L.F., 1978, “Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with
Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables”, International Economic Review, 19,
No. 2, 415—433.
Martin, S., 1995, “R&D Joint Ventures and Tacit Product Market Collusion”, European
Journal of Political Economy 11, 733—741.
Mueller D.C., ed., “The Determinants and Eﬀects of Mergers: An International Com-
parison”, Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980.
Mueller, D.C., 1985, “Mergers and Market Share”, Review of Economics and Statistics,
67(2), 259—267.
Pesendorfer, M., 2003, ”Horizontal Mergers in the Paper Industry”, Rand Journal of
Economics, 34(3), pp. 495-515.
Ravenscraft, D.J. and F.M. Scherer, 1987, “Mergers, Sell-Oﬀs and Economic Eﬃciency”,
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
R¨ oller, L.H., R. Siebert and M.M. Tombak, 2000, “Strategic Choice of Partners: Research
Joint Ventures and Market Power”, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.
R¨ oller, L.H. and K. Stahl, 2002, “Merger vs. Research Joint Venture under R&D Eﬃ-
ciencies”, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and University of Mannheim.
Salant, S.W., S. Switzer and R.J. Reynolds, 1983, “Losses from Horizontal Merger: The
Eﬀects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilib-
rium”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XCVIII, No. 2, 185—199.
Shapiro, C. and R.D. Willig, 1990, “On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint
Ventures”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (3), 113—130.
24Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 2001, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, NBER WP No.
8439.
Song, M., 2003, “A Dynamic Model of Cooperative Research in the Semiconductor
Industry”, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University.
Spence, M., 1984, “Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Performance”, Econo-
metrica 52 (1), 101—121.
Werden, G.J., and L.M. Froeb, 1994, “The Eﬀects of Mergers in Diﬀerentiated Products
Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy”, Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 10 (2), 407—426.
Werden, G.J., and L.M. Froeb, 1998, “The Entry-Inducing Eﬀects of Horizontal Mergers:
An Exploratory Analysis”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 46 (4), 525—543.
Williamson, O.E., 1968, “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoﬀs”,
American Economic Review, 58, 18—36.
25Table 1a: International production rates in the semiconductor industry
U.S. Japan Europe Other
Semiconductor 39.6% 40.1% 8.5% 11.8%
Memory 24.6% 43.5% 3.7% 28.2%
Microcomponents 70.1% 23.5% 4.1% 2.2%
Table 1b: Revenues and market shares in the semiconductor industry
Years Revenues (Mio $-US) Herﬁndahl Index No. of active ﬁrms
1989 52,751 404 132
1990 54,578 383 140
1991 59,341 391 132
1992 64,774 386 157
1993 85,328 395 153
1994 109,402 402 154
1995 152,875 365 172
1996 143,402 430 158
1997 150,911 401 172
1998 138,747 475 188
1999 169,311 454 167
Average 107,402 408 157
26Table 1c: Revenues and market shares in the memory industry
Years Revenues (Mio $-US) Herﬁndahl Index No. of active ﬁrms
1989 14,502 637 49
1990 12,107 611 52
1991 12,668 602 52
1992 15,425 568 59
1993 23,274 563 57
1994 33,394 594 55
1995 55,842 616 55
1996 38,480 615 52
1997 31,324 611 55
1998 24,438 641 54
1999 34,591 804 48
Average 26,913 624 54
27Table 1d: Revenues and market shares in the microcomponents industry
Years Revenues (Mio $-US) Herﬁndahl Index No. of active ﬁrms
1989 7,789 983 51
1990 9,575 1145 54
1991 11,763 1241 59
1992 14,315 1356 72
1993 19,970 1620 77
1994 26,393 1532 79
1995 35,293 1434 83
1996 42,331 1746 84
1997 51,360 1803 87
1998 49,316 2141 92
1999 57,018 2176 88
Average 29,557 1562 75
28Table 2: : Research joint ventures and mergers: number of deals
Semiconductor Memory Microcomponents
Years RJVs Mergers RJVs Mergers RJVs Mergers
1989 13 4 2270
1990 20 5 6283
1991 35 4 5052
1992 29 10 73 15 3
1993 36 4 82 11 2
1994 39 7 11 5 10 5
1995 24 12 10 4 06
1996 17 7 3022
1997 18 11 3117
1998 13 19 2541 0
1999 0 28 01 001 3
1989-1999 244 111 57 34 63 53
29Table 3a: Mean semiconductor market shares of diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms from t−1u n t i l
t +3
t − 1 tt +1 t +2 t +3
RJV ﬁrms 3.15 3.09 3.25 3.46 3.58
Mergers:
Acquiring ﬁrms 2.46 2.82 3.34 3.75 3.71
Target ﬁr m s 0 . 3 0 - ---
Table 3b: Mean memory market shares of diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms from t − 1u n t i lt +3
t − 1 tt +1 t +2 t +3
RJV ﬁrms 4.10 4.16 4.22 4.37 4.48
Mergers:
Acquiring ﬁrms 1.51 2.22 2.28 2.33 2.29
Target ﬁr m s 0 . 9 0 - ---
Table 3c: Mean microcomponents market shares of diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms from t − 1
until t +3
t − 1 tt +1 t +2 t +3
RJV ﬁrms 5.37 5.51 5.57 5.62 5.98
Mergers:
Acquiring ﬁrms 5.30 6.03 6.22 6.43 6.67
Target ﬁrms 0.70 - - - -
30Table 4: Results for equation (1)
Dependent variable: sci,t
E q u a t i o n1234
x =0 x =1 x =2 x =3
Coef t-value Coef t-value Coef t-value Coef t-value
USA 0.00013 0.92 0.00027 1.06 0.00046 1.27 0.00068 1.27
Europe 0.00007 0.29 0.00007 0.06 −0.00003 −0.03 −0.00003 −0.03
Japan −0.00138 −6.24 −0.00302 −7.75 −0.00592 −7.34 −0.00595 −7.34
South Korea 0.00125 3.31 0.00216 3.30 0.00357 3.65 0.00547 4.18
sci,t−x−1 0.93022 19.76 0.91129 12.47 0.90007 8.16 0.88813 7.47
Mergeri,t 0.00028 0.56 0.00384 5.31 0.00522 7.06 0.00505 5.17
Mergeri,t−1 0.00169 2.34 0.00326 5.15 0.00439 6.46
Mergeri,t−2 −0.00014 −0.13 0.00191 2.72
Mergeri,t−3 −0.00098 −0.66
RJVi,t 0.00009 0.27 −0.00020 −0.38 −0.00085 −1.04 0.00069 0.64
RJVi,t−1 0.00076 1.45 0.00117 1.53 0.00087 0.86
RJVi,t−2 0.00114 1.46 0.00240 2.39
RJVi,t−3 0.00124 2.23
Constant −0.00010 −0.45 −0.00037 −1.00 0.00003 0.06 0.00059 0.87
R2-adjusted 0.850 0.862 0.884 0.891
No. Obs. 1,433 1,185 985 807
Tests:
Sum Merger coefs 0.00028 0.56 0.00553 5.58 0.00834 7.25 0.01037 7.31
Sum RJV coefs 0.00009 0.27 0.00056 0.74 0.00146 1.47 0.00520 3.33
Note: Estimation method is 2SLS with market share instrumented by patents accumulated in the
semiconductor industry.
31Table 5: An endogenous switching model: Estimates of system (2) to (3) for the
semiconductor industry, for x =3
Mergers RJVs
Coef Coef/St.E Coef Coef/St.E
Selection equation:
\ (scm,i,t − scnm,i,t) 46.869 8.74 22.619 6.27
Patentsi,t −0.746 −2.58 0.170 6.77
Sizei,t 0.136 2.49 0.133 2.35
Multii,t 0.941 4.02 0.725 2.81
Corrected market share equation:
scm,i,t−3 1.191 13.06 1.096 4.80
scnm,i,t−3 0.862 105.18 0.876 109.66
Variance parameters:
Sigma (0) 0.612 0.585
Rho(0, v) 0.874 0.104
Sigma (1) 0.159 0.154
Rho(1, v) −0.365 −0.107
Log likelihood function: 2358.7 1966.0
No. Obs. 807 807
Note: \ (scm,i,t − scnm,i,t) is the estimated diﬀerence in (combined) market shares between the two regimes;
Patentsi,t are the total number of patents accumulated of each ﬁrm until year t;S i z e i,t is the natural logarithm of
total assets in Mio USD; Multii,t is a dummy variable equal to one, if the ﬁrm operates in more than one segment of the
semiconductor industry, zero else; Included in the selection equation but not reported are a full set of year dummies and
country dummies for the USA, Europe, Japan and South Korea. X2 statistics (p-values): Merger equation: Year dummies:
14.08 (0.029); Country dummies: 21.28 (0.000); RJV equation: Year dummies: 32.92 (0.000); Country dummies: 2.02
(0.568).
32Table 6: Estimates of system (2) to (3) for the microcomponents market, for x =3
Mergers RJVs
Coef Coef/St.E Coef Coef/St.E
Selection equation:
\ (scm,i,t − scnm,i,t) 19.370 3.64 12.334 2.27
Patentsi,t −0.046 −0.58 0.220 2.77
Sizei,t 0.103 2.19 0.093 1.35
Multii,t 0.741 2.32 0.425 1.81
Corrected market share equation:
scm,i,t−3 1.253 9.16 1.153 3.76
scnm,i,t−3 0.822 44.22 0.876 32.63
Variance parameters:
Sigma (0) 0.244 0.354
Rho(0, v) 0.842 0.481
Sigma (1) 0.511 0.423
Rho(1, v) −0.366 −0.076
Log likelihood function: 1128.7 926.0
No. Obs. 312 312
Note: Variables are deﬁn e di na n a l o g yt oT a b l e5 . I n c l u d e di nt h es e l e c t i o ne q u a t i o nb u tn o tr e p o r t e da r eaf u l ls e t
of year dummies and country dummies for the USA, Europe, Japan and South Korea. X2 statistics (p-values): Merger
equation: Year dummies: 3.23 (0.779); Country dummies: 64.76 (0.000); RJV equation: Year dummies: 4.59 (0.205);
Country dummies: 0.47 (0.494).
33Table 7: Estimates of system (2) to (3) for the memory market, for x =3
Mergers RJVs
Coef Coef/St.E Coef Coef/St.E
Selection equation:
\ (scm,i,t − scnm,i,t) 8.223 0.64 22.334 1.27
Patentsi,t −0.146 −2.58 0.120 0.77
Sizei,t 0.173 2.23 0.193 1.98
Multii,t 0.980 1.12 0.625 1.41
Corrected market share equation:
scm,i,t−3 1.021 5.23 1.113 2.32
scnm,i,t−3 0.987 32.12 0.854 21.19
Variance parameters:
Sigma (0) 0.283 0.387
Rho(0, v) 0.375 0.902
Sigma (1) 0.096 0.473
Rho(1, v) −0.274 −0.036
Log likelihood function: 993.7 832.0
No. Obs. 212 212
Note: Variables are deﬁn e di na n a l o g yt oT a b l e5 . I n c l u d e di nt h es e l e c t i o ne q u a t i o nb u tn o tr e p o r t e da r eaf u l ls e t
of year dummies and country dummies for the USA, Europe, Japan and South Korea. X2 statistics (p-values): Merger
equation: Year dummies: 0.65 (0.420); Country dummies: 1.51 (0.823); RJV equation: Year dummies: 6.89 (0.076);
Country dummies: 5.38 (0.020).
34